We study the power of different types of adaptive (nonoblivious) adversaries in the setting of prediction with expert advice, under both full-information and bandit feedback. We measure the player's performance using a new notion of regret, also known as policy regret, which better captures the adversary's adaptiveness to the player's behavior. In a setting where losses are allowed to drift, we characterize -in a nearly complete manner-the power of adaptive adversaries with bounded memories and switching costs. In particular, we show that with switching costs, the attainable rate with bandit feedback is Θ(T 2/3 ). Interestingly, this rate is significantly worse than the Θ( √ T ) rate attainable with switching costs in the full-information case. Via a novel reduction from experts to bandits, we also show that a bounded memory adversary can force Θ(T 2/3 ) regret even in the full information case, proving that switching costs are easier to control than bounded memory adversaries. Our lower bounds rely on a new stochastic adversary strategy that generates loss processes with strong dependencies.
Introduction
An important instance of the framework of prediction with expert advice -see, e.g., Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] is defined as the following repeated game, between a randomized player with a finite and fixed set of available actions and an adversary. At the beginning of each round of the game, the adversary assigns a loss to each action. Next, the player defines a probability distribution over the actions, draws an action from this distribution, and suffers the loss associated with that action. The player's goal is to accumulate loss at the smallest possible rate, as the game progresses. Two versions of this game are typically considered: in the full-information feedback version of the game, at the end of each round, the player observes the adversary's assignment of loss values to each action. In the bandit feedback version, the player only observes the loss associated with his chosen action, but not the loss values of other actions.
We assume that the adversary is adaptive (also called nonoblivious by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] or reactive by Maillard and Munos [2010] ), which means that the adversary chooses the loss values on round t based on the player's actions on rounds 1 . . . t − 1. We also assume that the adversary is deterministic and has unlimited computational power. These assumptions imply that the adversary can specify his entire strategy before the game begins. In other words, the adversary can perform all of the calculations needed to specify, in advance, how he plans to react on each round to any sequence of actions chosen by the player.
More formally, let A denote the finite set of actions and let X t denote the player's random action on round t. We adopt the notation X 1:t as shorthand for the sequence X 1 . . . X t . We assume that the adversary defines, in advance, a sequence of history-dependent loss functions f 1 , f 2 , . . .. The input to each loss function f t is the entire history of the player's actions so far, therefore the player's loss on round t is f t (X 1:t ). Note that the player doesn't observe the functions f t , only the losses that result from his past actions. Specifically, in the bandit feedback model, the player observes f t (X 1:t ) on round t, whereas in the full-information model, the player observes f t (X 1:t−1 , x) for all x ∈ A.
On any round T , we evaluate the player's performance so far using the notion of regret, which compares his cumulative loss on the first T rounds to the cumulative loss of the best fixed action in hindsight. Formally, the player's regret on round T is defined as
f t (X 1:t ) − min x∈A T t=1 f t (x . . . x) .
(1)
R T is a random variable, as it depends on the randomized action sequence X 1:t . Therefore, we also consider the expected regret E[R T ]. This definition is the same as the one used in Merhav et al. [2002] and Arora et al. [2012] (in the latter, it is called policy regret), but differs from the more common definition of expected regret
The definition in Eq. (2) is more common in the literature (e.g., Auer et al. [2002] , McMahan and Blum [2004] , Dani and Hayes [2006] , Maillard and Munos [2010] ), but is clearly inadequate for measuring a player's performance against an adaptive adversary. Indeed, if the adversary is adaptive, the quantity f t (X 1:t−1 , x)is hardly interpretable -see Arora et al. [2012] for a more detailed discussion.
In general, we seek algorithms for which E[R T ] can be bounded by a sublinear function of T , implying that the per-round expected regret, E[R T ]/T , tends to zero. Unfortunately, Arora et al. [2012] shows that arbitrary adaptive adversaries can easily force the regret to grow linearly. Thus, we need to focus on (reasonably) weaker adversaries, which have constraints on the loss functions they can generate.
The weakest adversary we discuss is the oblivious adversary, which determines the loss on round t based only on the current action X t . In other words, this adversary is oblivious to the player's past actions. Formally, the oblivious adversary is constrained to choose a sequence of loss functions that satisfies ∀t, ∀x 1:t ∈ A t , and ∀x ′ 1:t−1 ∈ A t−1 , f t (x 1:t ) = f t (x ′ 1:t−1 , x t ) .
The majority of previous work in online learning focuses on oblivious adversaries. When dealing with oblivious adversaries, we denote the loss function by ℓ t and omit the first t − 1 arguments. With this notation, the loss at time t is simply written as ℓ t (X t ). For example, imagine an investor that invests in a single stock at a time. On each trading day he invests in one stock and suffers losses accordingly. In this example, the investor is the player and the stock market is the adversary. If the investment amount is small, the investor's actions will have no measurable effect on the market, so the market is oblivious to the investor's actions. Also note that this example relates to the full-information feedback version of the game, as the investor can see the performance of each stock at the end of each trading day.
A stronger adversary is the oblivious adversary with switching costs. This adversary is similar to the oblivious adversary defined above, but charges the player an additional switching cost of 1 whenever X t = X t−1 . More formally, this adversary defines his sequence of loss functions in two steps: first he chooses an oblivious sequence of loss functions, ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 . . ., which satisfies the constraint in Eq. (3). Then, he sets f 1 (x) = ℓ 1 (x), and
This is a very natural setting. For example, let us consider again the single-stock investor, but now assume that each trade has a fixed commission cost. If the investor keeps his position in a stock for multiple trading days, he is exempt from any additional fees, but when he sells one stock and buys another, he incurs a fixed commission. More generally, this setting (or simple generalizations of it) allows us to capture any situation where choosing a different action involves a costly change of state. In the paper, we will also discuss a special case of this adversary, where the loss function ℓ t (x) for each action is sampled i.i.d. from a fixed distribution.
The switching costs adversary defines the loss on round t as a function of X t and X t−1 , and is therefore a special case of a more general adversary called an adaptive adversary with a memory of 1. This adversary is constrained to choose loss functions that satisfy ∀t, ∀x 1:t ∈ A t , and ∀x
This adversary is more general than the switching costs adversary because his loss functions can depend on the previous action in an arbitrary way. We can further strengthen this adversary and define the bounded memory adaptive adversary, which has a bounded memory of an arbitrary size. In other words, this adversary is allowed to set his loss function based on the player's m most recent past actions, where m is a predefined parameter. Formally, the bounded memory adversary must choose loss functions that satisfy, ∀t, ∀x 1:t ∈ A t , and ∀x
In the information theory literature, this setting is called individual sequence prediction against loss functions with memory Merhav et al. [2002] . In addition to the adversary types described above, the bounded memory adaptive adversary has additional interesting special cases. One of them is the delayed feedback oblivious adversary of Mesterharm [2005] , which defines an oblivious loss sequence, but reveals each loss value with a delay of m rounds. Since the loss at time t depends on the player's action at time t − m, this adversary is a special case of a bounded memory adversary with a memory of size m. The delayed feedback adversary is not a focus of our work, and we present it merely as an interesting special case.
So far, we have defined a succession of adversaries of different strengths. This paper's goal is to understand the upper and lower bounds on the player's regret when he faces these adversaries. Specifically, we focus on how the expected regret depends on the number of rounds, T , with either full-information or bandit feedback.
The Current State of the Art
Different aspects of this problem have been previously studied and the known results are surveyed below and summarized in Table 1 . Most of these previous results rely on the additional assumption that the range of the loss functions is bounded in a fixed interval, say [0, C]. We explicitly make note of this because our new results require us to slightly generalize this assumption.
As mentioned above, the oblivious adversary has been studied extensively and is the best understood of all the adversaries discussed in this paper. With full-information feedback, both the Hedge algorithm Littlestone and Warmuth [1994] , Freund and Schapire [1997] and the follow the perturbed leader (FPL) algorithm Kalai and Vempala [2005] guarantee a regret of O( √ T ), with a matching lower bound of Ω( √ T ) -see, e.g., Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] . Analyses of Hedge in settings where the loss range may vary over time have also been considered -see, e.g., Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2007] . The oblivious setting with bandit feedback, where the player only observes the incurred loss f t (X 1:t ), is called the nonstochastic (or adversarial) multi-armed bandit problem. In this setting, the Exp3 algorithm of Auer et al. [2002] guarantees the same regret O( √ T ) as the full-information setting, and clearly the full-information lower bound Ω( √ T ) still applies. The follow the lazy leader (FLL) algorithm of Kalai and Vempala [2005] is designed for the switching costs setting with full-information feedback. The analysis of FLL guarantees that the oblivious component of the player's expected regret (without counting the switching costs), as well as the expected number of switches, is upper bounded by O( √ T ), implying an expected regret of at most O( √ T ). The algorithm of Merhav et al. [2002] focuses on the bounded memory adversary with full-information feedback, referring to this problem as loss functions with memory, and guaranteeing a regret of O(T 2/3 ). The work of Arora et al. [2012] extends this result to the bandit feedback case, maintaining the same regret bound.
Learning with bandit feedback and switching costs has mostly been considered in the economics literature, using a different setting than ours and with prior knowledge assumptions (see Jun [2004] for an overview). The setting of stochastic oblivious adversaries (i.e., oblivious loss functions sampled i.i.d. from a fixed distribution) was first studied by Agrawal et al. [1988] , where they show that O(log T ) switches are sufficient to asymptotically guarantee logarithmic regret. The paper Ortner [2010] achieves logarithmic regret nonasymptotically with O(log T ) switches. oblivious switching cost memory of size 1 bounded memory adaptive Full-Information Feedback Several other papers discuss online learning against "adaptive" adversaries Auer et al. [2002] , Dani and Hayes [2006] , Maillard and Munos [2010] , McMahan and Blum [2004] , but these results are not relevant to our work and can be easily misunderstood. For example, even the Exp3 algorithm of Auer et al. [2002] has extensions to the "adaptive" adversary case, with a regret upper bound of O( √ T ). This bound doesn't contradict the Ω(T ) lower bound for general adaptive adversaries mentioned earlier, since these papers use the regret defined in Eq. (2) rather than the regret used in our work, defined in Eq. (1).
Another related body of work lies in the field of competitive analysis -see Borodin and El-Yaniv [1998] , which also deals with loss functions that depend on the player's past actions, and the adversary's memory may even be unbounded. However, obtaining sublinear regret is generally impossible in this case. Therefore, competitive analysis studies much weaker performance metrics such as the competitive ratio, making it orthogonal to our work.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we make the following contributions (see Table 1 ):
• Our main technical contribution is a new lower bound on regret that matches the existing upper bounds in several of the settings discussed above. Specifically, our lower bound applies to the switching costs adversary with bandit feedback and to all strictly stronger adversaries.
• Building on this lower bound, we prove another regret lower bound in the bounded memory setting with fullinformation feedback, again matching the known upper bound.
• We confirm that existing upper bounds on regret hold in our setting and match the lower bounds up to logarithmic factors.
• Despite the lower bound, we show that for switching costs and bandit feedback, if we also assume stochastic i.i.d. losses, then one can get a distribution-free regret bound of O( √ T log log log T ) for finite action sets, with only O(log log T ) switches. This result uses ideas from Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2013] , and is deferred to Appendix A.
Our new lower bound is a significant step towards a complete understanding of adaptive adversaries; observe that the upper and lower bounds in Table 1 essentially match in all but one of the settings.
Our results have two important consequences. First, observe that the optimal regret against the switching costs adversary is Θ √ T with full-information feedback, versus Θ T 2/3 with bandit feedback. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first theoretical confirmation that learning with bandit feedback is strictly harder than learning with full-information, even on a small finite action set and even in terms of the dependence on T (previous gaps we are aware of were either in terms of the number of actions Auer et al. [2002] , or required large or continuous action spaces -see, e.g., Bubeck et al. [2011 ], Shamir [2012 ). Moreover, recall the regret bound of O √ T log log log T against the stochastic i.i.d. adversary with switching costs and bandit feedback. This demonstrates that dependencies in the loss process must play a crucial role in controlling the power of the switching costs adversary. Indeed, the Ω T 2/3 lower bound proven in the next section heavily relies on such dependencies.
Second, observe that in the full-information feedback case, the optimal regret against a switching costs adversary is Θ( √ T ), whereas the optimal regret against the more general bounded memory adversary is Ω(T 2/3 ). This is somewhat surprising given the ideas presented in Merhav et al. [2002] and later extended in Arora et al. [2012] : The main technique used in these papers is to take an algorithm originally designed for oblivious adversaries, forcefully prevent it from switching actions very often, and obtain a new algorithm that guarantees a regret of O(T 2/3 ) against bounded memory adversaries. This would seem to imply that a small number of switches is the key to dealing with general bounded memory adversaries. Our result contradicts this intuition by showing that controlling the number of switches is easier then dealing with a general bounded memory adversary.
As noted above, our lower bounds require us to slightly weaken the standard technical assumption that loss values lie in a fixed interval [0, C]. We replace it with the following two assumptions:
1. Bounded range. We assume that the loss values on each individual round are bounded in an interval of constant size C, but we allow this interval to drift from round to round. Formally, ∀t, ∀x 1:t ∈ A t and ∀x
2. Bounded drift. We also assume that the drift of each individual action from round to round is contained in a bounded interval of size D t , where D t may grow slowly, as O log(t) . Formally, ∀t and ∀x 1:t ∈ A t ,
Since these assumptions are a relaxation of the standard assumption, all of the known lower bounds on regret automatically extend to our relaxed setting. For our results to be consistent with the current state of the art, we must also prove that all of the known upper bounds continue to hold after the relaxation, up to logarithmic factors.
Lower Bounds
In this section, we prove lower bounds on the player's expected regret in various settings.
Ω(T 2/3 ) with Switching Costs and Bandit Feedback
We begin with a Ω(T 2/3 ) regret lower bound against an oblivious adversary with switching costs, when the player receives bandit feedback. It is enough to consider a very simple setting, with only two actions, labeled 1 and 2. Using the notation introduced earlier, we use ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , . . . to denote the oblivious sequence of loss functions chosen by the adversary before adding the switching cost. Theorem 1. For any player strategy that relies on bandit feedback and for any number of rounds T , there exist loss functions f 1 , . . . , f T that are oblivious with switching costs, with a range bounded by C = 2, and a drift bounded by
The full proof is given in Appendix B, and here we give an informal proof sketch. We begin by constructing a randomized adversarial strategy, where the loss functions ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ T are an instantiation of random variables L t , . . . , L T defined as follows. Let ξ 1 , . . . , ξ T be i.i.d. standard Gaussian random variables (with zero mean and unit variance) and let Z be a random variable that equals −1 or 1 with equal probability. Using these random variables, define for all
In words, {L t (1)} T t=1 is simply a Gaussian random walk and {L t (2)} T t=1 is the same random walk, slightly shifted up or down -see figure 1 for an illustration. It is straightforward to confirm that this loss sequence has a bounded range, as required by the theorem: by construction we have |ℓ t (1) − ℓ t (2)| = T −1/3 ≤ 1 for all t, and since the switching cost can add at most 1 to the loss on each round, we conclude that |f t (1) − f t (2)| ≤ 2 for all t. Next, we 8). The sequence of losses for action 1 follows a Gaussian random walk, whereas the sequence of losses for action 2 follows the same random walk, but slightly shifted either up or down.
show that the expected regret of any player against this random loss sequence is Ω(T 2/3 ), where expectation is taken over the randomization of both the adversary and the player. The intuition is that the player can only gain information about which action is better by switching between them. Otherwise, if he stays on the same action, he only observes a random walk, and gets no further information. Since the gap between the two losses on each round is T −1/3 , the player must perform Ω(T 2/3 ) switches before he can identify the better action. If the player performs that many switches, the total regret incurred due to the switching costs is Ω(T 2/3 ). Alternatively, if the player performs o(T 2/3 ) switches, he can't identify the better action; as a result he suffers an expected regret of Ω(T −1/3 ) on each round and a total regret of Ω(T 2/3 ). Since the randomized loss sequence defined in Eq. (8), plus a switching cost, achieves an expected regret of Ω(T 2/3 ), there must exist at least one deterministic loss sequence ℓ 1 . . . ℓ T with a regret of Ω(T 2/3 ). In our proof, we show that there exists such ℓ 1 . . . ℓ T with bounded drift.
Ω(T 2/3 ) with Bounded Memory and Full-Information Feedback
We build on Thm. 1 and prove a Ω(T 2/3 ) regret lower bound in the full-information setting, where we get to see the entire loss vector on every round. To get this strong result, we need to give the adversary a little bit of extra power: memory of size 2 instead of size 1 as in the case of switching costs. To show this result, we again consider a simple setting with two actions.
Theorem 2. For any player strategy that relies on full-information feedback and for any number of rounds T ≥ 2,
there exist loss functions f 1 , . . . , f T , each with a memory of size m = 2, a range bounded by C = 2, and a drift bounded by D t = 3 log(t) + 18, such that
The formal proof is deferred to Appendix C and a proof sketch is given here. The proof is based on a reduction from full-information to bandit feedback that might be of independent interest. We construct the adversarial loss sequence as follows: on each round, the adversary assigns the same loss to both actions. Namely, the value of the loss depends only on the player's previous two actions, and not on his action on the current round. Recall that even in the full-information version of the game, the player doesn't know what the losses would have been had he chosen different actions in the past. Therefore, we have made the full-information game as difficult as the bandit game.
Specifically, we construct an oblivious loss sequence ℓ 1 . . . ℓ T as in Thm. 1 and define
In words, we define the loss on round t of the full-information game to be equal to the loss on round t − 1 of a banditswith-switching-costs game in which the player chooses the same sequence of actions. This can be done with a memory of size 2, since the loss in Eq. (9) is fully specified by the player's choices on rounds t, t − 1, t − 2. Therefore, the Ω(T 2/3 ) lower bound for switching costs and bandit feedback extends to the full-information setting with a memory of size at least 2.
Upper Bounds
In this section, we show that the known upper bounds on regret, originally proved for bounded losses, can be extended to the case of losses with bounded range and bounded drift. Specifically, of the upper bounds that appear in Table 1 , we prove the following:
• O( √ T ) for an oblivious adversary with switching costs, with full-information feedback.
• O( √ T ) for an oblivious adversary with bandit feedback (where O hides logarithmic factors).
• O(T 2/3 ) for a bounded memory adversary with bandit feedback.
The remaining upper bounds in Table 1 are either trivial or follow from the principle that an upper bound still holds if we weaken the adversary or provide a more informative feedback.
O( √ T ) with Switching Costs and Full-Information Feedback
In this setting, f t (x 1:t ) = ℓ t (x t ) + I {xt =xt−1} . If the oblivious losses ℓ 1 . . . ℓ T (without the additional switching costs) were all bounded in [0, 1], the Follow the Lazy Leader (FLL) algorithm of Kalai and Vempala [2005] would guarantee a regret of O( √ T ) with respect to these losses (again, without the additional switching costs). Additionally, FLL guarantees that its expected number of switches is O( √ T ). We use a simple reduction to extend these guarantees to loss functions with a range bounded in an interval of size C and with an arbitrary drift.
On round t, after choosing an action and receiving the loss function ℓ t , the player defines the modified loss ℓ The formal proof is given in Appendix D but the proof technique is quite straightforward. We first show that each ℓ 
O( √ T ) with an Oblivious Adversary and Bandit Feedback
In this setting, f t (x 1:t ) simply equals ℓ t (x t ). The reduction described in the previous subsection cannot be used in the bandit setting, since min x ℓ t (x) is unknown to the player, and a different reduction is needed. The player sets a fixed horizon T and focuses on controlling his regret at time T ; he can then use a standard doubling trick Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] to handle an infinite horizon. The player uses the fact that each f t has a range bounded by C. Additionally, he defines D = max t≤T D t and on each round he defines the modified loss
Note that f ′ t (X 1:t ) can be computed by the player using only bandit feedback. The player then feeds f ′ t (X 1:t ) to an algorithm that guarantees a O( √ T ) standard regret (see definition in Eq. (2)) against an adaptive adversary. The Exp3.P algorithm, due to Auer et al. [2002] , is such an algorithm. The player chooses his actions according to the choices made by Exp3.P. The following theorem states that this reduction results in a bandit algorithm that guarantees a regret of O( √ T ) against oblivious adversaries. 
O(T 2/3 ) with Bounded Memory and Bandit Feedback
Proving an upper bound against an adversary with a memory of size m, with bandit feedback, requires a more delicate reduction. As in the previous section, we assume a finite horizon T and we let D = max t D t . Let K = |A| be the number of actions available to the player. Since f T (x 1:t ) depends only on the last m + 1 actions in x 1:t , we slightly overload our notation and define f t (x t−m:t ) to mean the same as f t (x 1:t ). To define the reduction, the player fixes a base action x 0 ∈ A and for each t > m he defines the loss function
Next, he divides the T rounds into J consecutive epochs of equal length, where J = Θ(T 2/3 ). We assume that the epoch length T /J is at least 2K(m + 1), which is true when T is sufficiently large. At the beginning of each epoch, the player plans his action sequence for the entire epoch. He uses some of the rounds in the epoch for exploration and the rest for exploitation. For each action in A, the player chooses an exploration interval of 2(m + 1) consecutive rounds within the epoch. These K intervals are chosen randomly, but they are not allowed to overlap, giving a total of 2K(m + 1) exploration rounds in the epoch. The details of how these intervals are drawn appears in our analysis, in Appendix D. The remaining T /J − 2K(m + 1) rounds are used for exploitation.
The player runs the Hedge algorithm Freund and Schapire [1997] in the background, invoking it only at the beginning of each epoch and using it to choose one exploitation action that will be played consistently on all of the exploitation rounds in the epoch. In the exploration interval for action x, the player first plays m + 1 rounds of the base action x 0 followed by m + 1 rounds of the action x. Letting t x denote the first round in this interval, the player uses the observed losses f tx+m (x 0 . . . x 0 ) and f tx+2m+1 (x . . . x) to compute f tx+2m+1 (x . . . x). In our analysis, we show that the latter is an unbiased estimate of the average value of f t (x . . . x) over t in the epoch. At the end of the epoch, the K estimates are fed as feedback to the Hedge algorithm.
We prove the following regret bound, with the proof deferred to Appendix D. 
Discussion
In this paper, we studied the problem of prediction with expert advice against different types of adversaries, ranging from the oblivious adversary to the general adaptive adversary. We proved upper and lower bounds on the player's regret against each of these adversary types, in both the full-information and the bandit feedback models. Our lower bounds essentially matched our upper bounds in all but one case: the adaptive adversary with a unit memory in the full-information setting, where we only know that regret is Ω( √ T ) and O(T 2/3 ). Our new bounds have two important consequences. First, we characterize the regret attainable with switching costs, and show a setting where predicting with bandit feedback is strictly more difficult than predicting with fullinformation feedback -even in terms of the dependence on T , and even on small finite action sets. Second, in the full-information setting, we show that predicting against a switching costs adversary is strictly easier than predicting against an arbitrary adversary with a bounded memory.
To obtain our results, we had to slightly relax the standard assumption that loss values are bounded in [0, 1]. Re-introducing this assumption and proving similar lower bounds remains an elusive open problem. Many other questions remain unanswered. Can we characterize the dependence of the regret on the size of the action set A? Can we strengthen any of our expected regret bounds to bounds that hold with high probability? Can any of our results be generalized to more sophisticated notions of regret, such as shifting regret and swap regret, as in Arora et al. [2012] ?
In addition to the adversary types discussed in this paper, there are other interesting classes of adversaries that lie between the oblivious and the adaptive. One of these is the oblivious adversary with delayed feedback, briefly mentioned in the introduction. While some results for this adversary exist (see Mesterharm [2005] ), the attainable regret, especially in the bandit feedback case, is not clear. Another interesting case is the family of deterministically adaptive adversaries, which includes adversaries that adapt to the player's actions (so they are not oblivious) in a known deterministic way, rather than in a secret malicious way. For example, imagine playing a multi-armed bandit game where the loss values are initially oblivious, but whenever the player chooses an arm with zero loss, the loss of the same arm on the next round is deterministically changed to zero. In other words, whenever the player suffers a zero loss, he knows that choosing the same arm again guarantees another zero loss. This is an important setting because many real-world online prediction scenarios are indeed deterministically adaptive. 
Appendices A Distribution-free regret bound for bandits with switching costs
In this appendix we adapt results of Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2013] to show a strategy that achieves O √ T log log log T regret against any i.i.d. oblivious adversary in the bandit setting with switching costs, assuming a finite action set A = {1 . . . K}. The strategy used by this stochastic adversary is specified by a probability distribution over oblivious loss functions. The oblivious loss function for each step t = 1, 2, . . . is the realization on an independent draw L t from this distribution. The regret of a player choosing actions X 0 = X 1 , X 2 , . . . is defined by
where the expectation E is over the random draw of each L t and the possible randomization of the player, and the expectation E t is conditioned over X 1 , L 1 (X 1 ), . . . , X t−1 , L t−1 (X t−1 ).
Our result focuses on loss distributions such that the law of each marginal L 1 (x) is subgaussian. A random variable Z is subgaussian if there exist constants b, c such that for any a > 0 P Z > E Z + a ≤ be −ca 2 and
2 . One can then show that, for any i.i.d. sequence Z 1 , . . . , Z T of subgaussian random variables,
In the following, we use the notation E L t (x) = µ(x) and µ * = min x∈A µ(x) .
Theorem 6. Consider a finite action set A = {1 . . . K}. Then for each T there exists a deterministic player strategy for the bandit game with i.i.d. oblivious adversaries and switching costs, whose regret after T steps is
O √ T log log log T with high probability, provided the distribution of L 1 (x) is sugaussian for each x ∈ A.
Proof. Consider the following player that proceeds in stages. At each stage s = 1, 2, . . . , S, the player maintains a set A s ⊆ A of active actions. Each action is played T s /|A s | times in a round-robin fashion, where T s = T
1−2
−s is the total number of plays in stage s and T is the known horizon. Note that the overall number of switches is at most KS, where
Let µ s (x) the sample mean of losses for action x in stage s, and define
the best empirical action in stage s. The sets A s of active actions are defined as follows: A 1 = A and
Note that A S ⊆ · · · ⊆ A 1 by construction. Also, using (11) and the union bound we have that
simultaneously for all s = 1, . . . , S with probability at least 1 − δ. We claim the following. Claim 1. With probability at least 1 − δ,
Proof of Claim. We prove the lemma by induction on s = 1, . . . , S. We first show that the base case s = 1 holds with probability at least 1 − δ/S. Then we show that if the claim holds for s − 1, then it holds for s with probability at least 1 − δ/S over all random events in stage s. Therefore, using a union bound over s = 1, . . . , S we get that the claim holds simultaneously for all s with probability at least 1 − δ.
For the base case s = 1 note that x * ∈ A 1 by definition, and thus µ 1 ( x 1 ) ≤ µ 1 (x * ) holds. Moreover, using (12) we obtain that
holds with probability at least 1 − δ/S. Since µ(x * ) − µ( x 1 ) ≤ 0 by definition of x * , we obtain
as required. We now prove the claim for s > 1 using the inductive assumption
The inductive assumption directly implies that x * ∈ A s . Thus we have µ i ( x s ) ≤ µ s (x * ), because x s minimizes µ s over a set that contains x * . The rest of the proof of the claim closely follows that of the base case s = 1.
Now, for any s = 1, . . . , S and for any x ∈ A s we have that
by (12) holds with probability at least 1 − δ/S. Hence, recalling that
I {Xt =Xt−1} ≤ KS holds deterministically, the regret of the player over the T plays can be bounded as follows
Now, since T 1 = √ T , T s / T s−1 = √ T and S = O ln ln T , we obtain that with probability at least 1 − δ the regret is at most of order
B Proof of Thm. 1
As mentioned in the text, we first consider the player's expected regret against a randomized adversary. Specifically, we define
where ξ 1 . . . ξ T are independent standard Gaussians, Z equals −1 or 1 with equal probability, and ǫ is the gap between the losses of the two actions (which will later be set to ǫ = T −1/3 ). Next, we assume for now, without loss of generality, that the player is deterministic. A deterministic player chooses each action X t as a deterministic function of the random losses suffered on the previous rounds, L 1 (X 1 ) . . . L t−1 (X t−1 ). We can make this assumption because any randomized player strategy can be seen as a distribution over deterministic player strategies, and since the randomization used by the adversary is independent of the player's strategy.
In the results below, P denotes the distribution of the randomized adversary. We also introduce the conditional distributions S = P(· | Z > 0) (i.e., 1 is the better action) and Q = P(· | Z < 0) (i.e., 2 is the better action). Since Z has an equal probability of being negative or positive, it holds that P = 1 2 (S + Q). We begin with the following technical lemma. Lemma 1. Let I {xt−1 =xt} indicate whether the player switched actions on round t (and 1 for t = 1). Then for any event A,
where the expectation in the right-hand side is with respect to P.
Proof. To show this, we use the chain rule for relative entropy, which implies
where S t−1 and Q t−1 denote the distributions of the player's loss L t (x t ) conditioned on L 1 , . . . , L t−1 , when the joint distribution of L 1 , . . . , L T is, respectively, S and Q. Let us focus on a particular term D KL S t−1 Q t−1 and a particular realization of the random losses L 1 , . . . , L t−1 . Since we assume a deterministic player strategy, for any such realization the player's choices x 1:t are all determined, and we deterministically have that the player either switched or not at time t. If he did not switch, then L t (x t ) is distributed as L t−1 (x t−1 ) + ξ t under both measures S t−1 and Q t−1 , so the relative entropy between them is zero. If he did switch, then L t (x t ) is distributed as L t−1 (x t−1 ) − ǫ + ξ under S t−1 (where the switch is towards the best action), and as L t−1 (x t−1 ) + ǫ + ξ under Q t−1 (where the switch is towards the worst action). Hence, the relative entropy is the same as two standard Gaussians whose means are shifted by 2ǫ, namely 2ǫ
2 . So overall, we can upper bound Eq. (13) by
Using a similar argument, we also show that D KL Q S is upper bounded by Eq. (14) in which the conditioning on Z > 0 is replaced by Z < 0. Then, Pinsker's inequality implies that S(A) − Q(A) 2 is at most
which gives the desired bound.
With this lemma, we can prove a lower bound on the expected regret for randomized adversaries.
Lemma 2. By picking ǫ = T −1/3 , the expected regret of any deterministic player strategy, over the randomness of the adversary, is at least
Proof. Let A be the event that the worst action (action 2 if Z > 0, and 1 if Z < 0) was picked by the player at least T /2 times. Also, let S T = T t=1 I {Xt =Xt−1} be the number of switches the player performs. Then
Moreover, letting A 1 denote the event that the player chose action 1 at least T /2 times, and letting A 2 denote the event that the player chose action 2 at least T /2 times, we have P(A) = 1 2 S(A 2 ) + Q(A 1 ) . Substituting this, we get
Using Lemma 1 to lower bound Q(A 1 ) via S(A 1 ), we get a lower bound of
where we used a union bound and the fact that either A 1 or A 2 always holds. This is a quadratic function of E[S T ], and it is easily verified that the lowest possible value it can attain (for any value of
Picking ǫ = T −1/3 , this equals
The lemma above tells us that for the randomized adversary strategy we have devised, the expected regret for any deterministic player is at least 1 10 T 2/3 . This implies that there exist some deterministic adversarial strategy, for which the expected regret of any possibly randomized player is at least 1 10 T 2/3 . However, we are not done yet, since this strategy doesn't guarantee that the losses have bounded drift: In our case, the variation is governed by a potentially unbounded Gaussian random variable, so the deterministic adversary strategy that we picked might have an arbitrarily large drift. So now, our goal will be to show that there exists some deterministic adversarial strategy for which the expected regret is large, and the variation is bounded. To do this, the plan is to show that the probabilities (over the adversary's strategy) of the two events are large, summing to a number larger than one. This means there is some realization of the losses such that both events occur. We first state and prove two auxiliary lemmas, and then provide two more fundamental lemmas which together give us the required result. 
Proof.
Solving for P(Y ≥ c/2) gives the desired result.
Lemma 4. Let ξ 1 , ξ 2 , . . . be an infinite sequence of independent standard Gaussian random variables. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1)
Proof. By a standard Gaussian tail bound, we have that P(|ξ t | > x) ≤ exp(−x 2 /2) for any x ≥ 0. This implies that
By a union bound, we get that
3/2 ≤ δ 3/2 < δ.
Lemma 5. For any (possibly randomized) player strategy, it holds that
where P is over the adversary's randomization, and E player [R T ] is the player's expected regret (over the player's randomization).
Proof. By Lemma 2, we already know that
since if we have a T 2/3 /10 lower bound on the regret for any deterministic player strategy, the same holds for any randomized player strategy. Our approach is to apply Lemma 3 in order to convert this into a probability lower bound as in the lemma statement. However, we cannot apply Lemma 3 as-is, since E player [R T ] can be as large as Ω(T ), and the resulting bound is too weak. Instead, we show that there exists a different player strategy, with expected regret
2/3 and
for any realization of the adversary's random strategy. Also, analogous to Eq. (15), we have
by Lemma 2. Therefore, using Eq. (16) and Lemma 3, we get that
as required.
The new player strategy we consider depends on the horizon T , and is very simple: It is identical to the original player strategy, but whenever the number of action switches reaches ⌊T 2/3 ⌋, the player "freezes" in its current action, and keeps playing the same action till T rounds are elapsed. Clearly, the number of switches with this strategy can never be more than T 2/3 , and since the regret in terms of the loss ℓ t at each round is either 0 or T −1/3 , we get that the total regret R T can never be more than T 2/3 + T * T −1/3 = 2T 2/3 . To prove Eq. (16), we consider some instantiation of the adversary's random strategy, and note that for any realization of the player's random coin tosses, the regret can only differ between the two strategies if S T (the total number of switches) is at least ⌊T 2/3 ⌋. Therefore, we have P player S T < ⌊T 2/3 ⌋ = P player S T < ⌊T 2/3 ⌋ ,
. Also, we recall that R T ≥ 0 with the adversary strategy that we consider (since one action is always worse than the other action at all rounds). Finally, we note that if S T ≥ ⌊T 2/3 ⌋, then the regret for both strategies is at least ⌊T 2/3 ⌋ (since with the adversary strategy that we consider, the number of switches is a lower bound on the regret). Using these observations, we have
where in the second-to-last step we used the fact that if S T ≥ ⌊T 2/3 ⌋, then the regret is at least ⌊T 2/3 ⌋, plus we must have picked the worst action (worst by T −1/3 than the best action) at least Ω(T 2/3 ) times, hence the total regret is certainly at least T 2/3 .
Finally, we use Lemma 4 with δ = 1/80, to get that with probability at least 1 − 1/80, the drift factor D t of the adversarial strategy is at most 3 log(160t) ≤ 3 log(t) + 16 for all t. Moreover, Lemma 5 tells us that E player [R T ] is at least 1 40 T 2/3 with probability at least 1/40. This implies that the intersection of the two events is non-empty, and there exists some deterministic adversarial strategy, such that the drift D t ≤ 3 log(t) + 16 for all t, and the expected regret is at least 1 40 T 2/3 as required.
C Proof of Thm. 2
Thm. 1 guarantees that given any player's strategy, there is some deterministic adversary strategy with a lower bound on the regret. However, as part of proving Thm. 1, we actually showed that there exists some randomized adversary strategy {f t } T t=1 with memory size 1, such that for any (possibly randomized) player strategy x 1:t ,
(see Lemma 2). We now use this strategy to define a randomized adversary strategy for our setting (with memory size 2), for a game of T + 1 rounds. We let f 1 (x 1 ) = 0 for any x 1 , f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) =f 1 (x 1 ), and for every t = 3 . . . T + 1,
Now, suppose we had some (possibly randomized) player strategy X 1 . . . X T +1 , so that in expectation over the player and adversary strategies, we have
f t (X t−2 , X t−1 , X t ) − min x∈A T +1 t=1 f t (x, x, x) < 1 10 T 2/3 .
In particular, since f 1 is always 0, it would imply that E T +1 t=2 f t (X t−2 , X t−1 , X t ) − min Thus, if we could implement the player strategy X 1 . . . X T in the bandits-with-switching-costs setting, it will contradict Eq. (17). To see that this indeed can happen, note that each X t is a (possibly randomized) function of X 1:t−1 as well as {f τ (X τ −2 , X τ −1 , X τ )} t−1 τ =1 . But again, due to Eq. (18) and the fact that f 1 is always 0, X t can in fact be defined using X 1:t−1 and f τ (X τ −2 , X τ −1 , X τ ) t−1 τ =2 = f τ −1 (X τ −2 , X τ −1 )
The right hand side is an observable quantity in the bandit setting: In each round t, we know what are the set of losses {f τ −1 (X τ −2 , X τ −1 )} t−1 τ =2 that we obtained. Thus, we can simulate the strategy x 1:t in the bandit-with-switching-costs setting, and get an expected regret smaller than 1 10 T 2/3 , contradicting Eq. (17). Thus, the expected regret (for a game of T + 1 rounds) must be at least 1 10 T 2/3 . Substituting T instead of T + 1, we get that the expected regret for a game with T rounds is at least 1 10 (T − 1) 2/3 . The regret bound we just now obtained is in expectation over the randomized adversary strategy, and holds for any player's strategy. We now use the same line of argument as in the last part of Thm. 1's proof, to show that for any (possibly randomized) player's strategy, there exists some deterministic adversary strategy, with a similar expected regret bound, and with losses of bounded drift. Specifically, a result completely analogous to Lemma 5 implies that
, which is at least 1/80 for any T > 1 (if T = 1 the bound in the theorem is trivial from the non-negativity of R T for the adversary strategy that we consider). Moreover, using Eq. (4) as in the proof of Thm. 1, the probability of the loss drift being at most 3 log(320t) ≤ 3 log(t) + 18 is at least 1 − 1/160. Thus, the intersection of the two events is not empty, and this implies that there exists some deterministic adversary strategy causing expected regret ≥ 1 40 (T − 1) 2/3 , and loss drift at most 3 log(t) + 18 for all t.
D Proofs of Upper Bounds
Proof of Thm. 3. Each loss functions equals f t (x 1:t ) = ℓ(x t ) + I {xt =xt−1} , where ℓ t is an oblivious loss function. Since the range of f t is contained in an interval of size C, the range of ℓ t must be contained in an interval of size C − 1. In other words, ∀x ∈ A ℓ t (x) − min Therefore,
Using the assumption that D t = O log(T ) , we conclude that
Proof of Thm. 5. First, note that, due to the bounded range and drift assumptions, f t ∈ [0, 1]. Also note that f t (x t−m:t ) − f t (x . . . x) = 2 C + (m + 1)D f t (x t−m:t ) − f t (x . . . x) .
As previously mentioned, we divide the T rounds into J consecutive epochs of the same length T /J, where T /J ≥ 2K(m + 1), plus an additional final epoch of length at most T /J. We let t j denote the index of the first round in the j-th epoch. We run a mini-batched version of the Hedge algorithm Freund and Schapire [1997] over the epochs: at the beginning of each epoch j, Hedge draws an action X j ∈ A which is played consistently throughout the epoch. Now assume that at the end of each epoch j, loss estimates g j (x) ∈ [0, 1] for each action x are available such that
where the randomness used to compute each g j is independent of that used by Hedge to draw X j . At the end of epoch
